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FRONT PAY UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT*
INTRODUCTION-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) I was enacted
in 1967 and amended in 1978 to ensure that employers would not dis-
criminate against employees between the ages of forty and seventy.
2
The ADEA draws its enforcement provisions from the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act 3 (FLSA), which allows discriminatees to recover lost wages.
Under the ADEA, trial courts may also grant liquidated damages in cases
of willful violation, 4 and they have "jurisdiction to grant such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employ-
ment, reinstatement or promotion." '5 Even within individual circuits,
court interpretations of this language have varied widely.6 The interpre-
tations have been most varied in the area of "front pay"-awarding fu-
ture damages in lieu of the specifically enumerated remedy of
reinstatement.
7
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael Nosier and Laura
Wing of Rothgerber, Appel, Powers &Johnson, Denver, Colorado, in the preparation of
this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). In fact,
the ADEA language "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation" (29
U.S.C. § 626(b)) is taken directly from the Fair Labor Standards Act and makes little sense
in the context of age discrimination. Any minimum wage or overtime violations are tan-
gential to age discrimination claims. See Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). In contrast, the FLSA provides for liquidated damages
for all violations.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
6. See, e.g., Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1984) ("the
AI)EA is limited to the damages specifically enumerated"); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say.
and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984) ("When we read this section as a whole
and construe it liberally, as we must .... we conclude that the legal and equitable remedies
available under the ADEA are not limited either to those specifically listed or to those
available under the FL.SA .. ") (citations omitted), cert. granted and jndgtent vacated on other
grounds, 105 S, Ct. 896, on remand and withdrawn in, 753 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).
7. For opinions denying awards of front pay, see Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d
276 (3d Cir. 1980); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1982); Jaffee v.
Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194 (D. Md. 1979); Mader v.
Control Data Corp.. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (D. Md. 1978). Covey v. Robert
A. Johnston, Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md. 1977); Price %. Marvland
Casuahy Co.. 391 F. Stipp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 1975). aftd. 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977);
Monroe v. Penn-l)ixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971). For cases ap-
proving front pay awards, see Wildman v. Ierner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (lst Cir.
1985); Mlaxfield v. Sinclair International, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985); Whittlesev v. Union
Carbide, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); l)avis v. Conibustion Eng'g Inc.. 742 F.2d 9 16 (6th
Cir. 1984): Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank
of Caliliinia, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981): Boyce v. Davis Oil Co., No. 83-M-179 (1).
Colo. Oct. 9, 1984): \'entura v. Federal l~ile Ins. Co.. 571 F. Supp. 48 (N.I). Il. 1983):
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In age discrimination cases, the courts must deal with a new and
unique set of circumstances. Court ordered hiring, promotion or rein-
statement is frequently impossible in age discrimination cases. Long pe-
riods of time usually lapse between the discriminatory act and the trial."
In the meantime, the employee discriminated against may have reached
retirement age, or economic changes may have forced the employer to
close plants, move or reduce staff.9 In addition, the stress of litigation
often heightens already acrimonious feelings, making reinstatement im-
possible. The more public contact an employee has, or the more the
employee supervises or makes company policy, the less likely that courts
will order reinstatement since a disgruntled employee can cause grave
damage in those positions.' 0 When reinstatement is impossible, an in-
creasing number of courts are awarding front pay as an alternative to
traditional remedies.
This article will discuss the older court decisions rejecting front pay
as an element of damages and the more recent cases awarding front pay.
The majority of circuits now recognize that front pay awards are valid
under the ADEA, yet many trial courts have been careless both in award-
ing and measuring front pay damages. After examining the various fac-
tors courts have considered in awarding front pay, this article will
conclude by listing the factors a court should consider in order to keep
front pay awards from being too remote or speculative.
I. THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR FRONT PAY AWARDS
The ADEA does not specifically include front pay as an element of
damages, and the legislative history of the statute contains no reference
to front pay. I I Courts derive the power to award front pay from their
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1982), afi'd in part,
rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp.
352 (D.N.H. 1981). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R. FED. 745 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (in which the discrimina-
tory act occurred in 1971, yet the District Court did not render its decision until 1977 (and
the Supreme Court not until 1982). 11 years after the discriminatory act).
9. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982). Mohawk closed its
plant because of declining demand for its tires and high production costs at the facility.
10. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984) (reinstatement inappro-
priate where plaintiff was corporation's chief labor counsel); see also Goldstein v. Manhat-
tan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (determination of whether
reinstatement more appropriate within the discretion of the trial court); Hoffman v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981) (financial award appropriate in lieu of rein-
statement); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (rein-
statement inappropriate for television newscaster). But c.f Dickerson v. Deluxe Check
Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983) (ordering reinstatement unless the parties
show it would be inappropriate; "I tihe friction arising from the litigation process itself is
not alone sulficient to deny employment . . .").
I 1. lhe House and Senate Reports on the original ADEA contain io discussion of the
damage provisions beyond the language of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 805. 90th Cong..
Isi Sess., rep/inled in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.;ws 2213, 2218. The Contference
agreenent fbr the 1978 amendment contains the following discussion of damages:
I[The ADEA[, which incorporates the remedial scheme of ... the FLSA
"aiiounts owing" contemplates two elements: First, it includes items of pectni-
ary or economic loss such as wages. fringe, and otIer job-rlated benefits. Sec-
ond, it includes liquidated damages (calculated as an aiount ecqlual to tile
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traditional equitable and remedial powers'-2 to make plaintiffs whole in
employment discrimination cases,' 3 and the express language of the
statute stating that "the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
this chapter, including, without limitation, judgments compelling
reinstatement."'14 The courts that have awarded front pay are not on
totally new ground; there is some precedent for front pay under title VII
of Civil Rights Act of 196415 and the FLSA. As early as 1962, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals encouraged front pay where reinstatement was
impossible in a FLSA case. 16 A number of title VII cases approved front
pay awards before front pay became a popular remedy under the
ADEA, 1 7 however, its effectiveness as a remedy has been limited be-
cause title VII cases seldom award large amounts of front pay. '8 ADEA
cases are substantially different than title VII or FLSA cases. Age dis-
crimination cases are unique because elderly plaintiffs often have a lim-
ited amount of working years before their retirement. Older plaintiffs
are more seriously damaged because it is difficult for them to find re-
placement jobs with similar salaries and responsibilities. To compensate
for this, front pay awards under the ADEA are normally higher than
those under title VII and the FLSA. 19
A few courts, however, continue to reject front pay as an element of
damages. The reasons cited fall into three major categories. First, front
pecuniary loss) which compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecuniary losses
arising out of a willful violation of the ADEA .... The ADEA as amended by this
act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature.... [Tihe Supreme Court has
made it clear that an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is not a penalty
but rather is available in order to provide full compensatory relief for losses that
are "too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated
damages.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 504, 535 (quoting Overnight Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942)).
12. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022 (Ist Cir. 1979).
13. See llhittlese., 742 F.2d at 727-28; Davis, 742 F.2d at 923; Koyen v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982). Under title VII, a person claiming to be injured as a
result of discrimination in employment may sue the offending employer in federal district
court. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
16. Goldberg v. Bama Mfg., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Mitchell v. Dyess.
180 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Ala. 1960).
17. E.g., Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 104 (4th Cir. 1979);James v. Stock-
ham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); White v. Caroline Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977); Patter-
son v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919,926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), ar/d.
559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Wirtz v. Atlas Roofing Mfg. Co.,
377 F.2d 112, 115 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 986 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945. 957 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. E.g., Fitzgerald, 624 F.2d at 956 (lost wages until employee reaches rightful place:
$20,478): Kallir, 420 F. Supp. at 927 (one year salary: $22,881); llirt-, 377 F.2d at 115 n.5
(parties agree to $100).
19. E.g., Whitlese', 742 F.2d at 729 (senior in-house labor attorney awarded four years
at full salary); Davis, 742 F.2d at 923 ($88,800 as front pay); IVenura, 571 F. Stipp. at 50-51
(six years salary as front pay).
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pay is speculative; it requires a court to consider factors such as the
plaintiff's projected life span, the future job market in the plaintiff's
profession, the likelihood of pay raises in the plaintiff's existing job, the
likelihood of pay raises in the plaintiff's substitute job, and the
probability that the defendant's business will close, move or reduce its
staff for legitimate purposes, resulting in a legal termination of the
plaintiff's job.20 Second, if front pay is awarded, the defendant's huge
potential liability discourages plaintiffs from settling because the poten-
tial benefit comes at no additional risk. 2 1 Finally, some courts reason
that front pay is punitive because it is payment for services not rendered:
Congress provided for punitive and speculative damages in the liqui-
dated damages section of the ADEA 2 2 and would have specifically in-
cluded front pay in that section if it had so desired.
The first case to discuss front pay under the ADEA, Monroe v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corporation,2 3 denied the plaintiff all benefits because he was
terminated before the ADEA was enacted. 24 In dictum, the court wrote
that any projection of damages beyond the date of trial would be too
speculative and that damages should be liquidated as of the date of trial.
It noted that courts are specifically empowered to reinstate plaintiffs and
a plaintiff who does not request reinstatement waives any right he may
have against his employer. 25 The court concluded by stating that
20. E.g., Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1982) (front pay too
speculative, often resulting in a prospective windfall for plaintiffs); Covey v. Robert A.
Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md. 1977) (front pay unprece-
dented, speculative, and would discourage courts from ordering reinstatement); see also
Gibson, 695 F.2d at 1093 (plant closes, circuit remands for trial court to determine whether,
absent discrimination, company would have transferred plaintiff). But see Koyen. 560 F.
Supp. at 1161 (future damages not too difficult to calculate; wrongdoer should bear risk of
uncertainty).
21. Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (D. Md. 1978)
(awarding front pay discourages settlement by plaintiffs).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1023 (dictum) (front pay consti-
tutes payment for services not rendered); Covey, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1192
(court does not want to discourage courts from denying reinstatement); Jaffee. 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1194 (citing with approval the Covey decision denying front pay).
23. 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 235. A number of courts refuse to grant front pay where the plaintiff does
not seek reinstatement. E.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276; Ginsburg v. Bur-
lington Industries, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This ignores the possibility
that plant closings, reduction in work force, or defendants' discrimination may make rein-
statement impossible. There is no reason to expect plaintiffs to request reinstatement
when all parties know it would be impossible. In Boyce v. Davis Oil Co., No. 83-M-179
(D.C. Colo. 1984), Judge Matsch found that there was "mutual dislike" and "animosity"
between the plaintiff, Boyce, and her former employer, Davis Oil Company. The oil com-
pany had offered Boyce reinstatement in an inferior position. Judge Matsch wrote that
Itlo require Margaret Boyce to return to Davis Oil Company under these circum-
stances would not only cause her difficulty; it would denigrate the purposes of the
Act by requiring an elderly woman to undergo the stress of working where she
isn't wanted. Accordingly, this is a case where the preferred remedy of reinstate-
ment is inappropriate, and front pay should be awarded.
Boyce, 83-M-179, slip op. at 2. As long as there are sound reasons why reinstatement is
inappropriate, there is no need to demand that plaintiffs file frivolous claims for reinstate-
ment.
A 1982 Supreme Court case may confuse this area. In a title VII case, Ford Motor Co.
[Vol. 63:1
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although plaintiffs lose some rights against their employers through
their inability to sue for front pay, defendants correspondingly cannot
show that plaintiffs obtained more lucrative positions in order to reduce
their liability for back pay.
26
The District of Maryland, following Monroe, denied front pay in
three cases: Covey v. Robert A. Johnson Co. ,27 Mader v. Control Data Corp. ,21
and Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting Co. 29 In each case, the court ruled that
the trial date is the cutoff point for measuring monetary losses to the
plaintiff, noting that it could find no authority for projecting lost income
beyond trial. The court also reasoned that the potential for immense
damages against an employer could discourage courts from ordering re-
instatement and dissuade plaintiffs from settling cases.' °
II. COURT AWARDS OF FRONT PAY
A. Early Cases Discussing Front Pay
The first case to raise the possibility of front pay as a damage award
in lieu of reinstatement was Loeb v. Textron, Inc. 31 The plaintiff in Loeb
was hired in 1971 when he was fifty years old and fired four years later.
3 2
The trial court decided that reinstatement was inappropriate and
awarded Loeb $90,000 in front pay and vested pension rights.3 3 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial based
on the jury instructions, but went ahead to discuss the damages issues
raised by the trial court. The court examined the legislative history of
the ADEA, finding that the award of pension benefits was "plainly au-
thorized" under the statute, but left the actual reimbursement scheme
up to the discretion of the trial court.3 4 The court then discussed the
award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and determined that front
pay may be available in limited circumstances as an element of damages
under "the traditional equitable powers of the federal courts and the
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982), the Court held that an offer of reinstatement terminated
former employees' backpay damages, even though plaintiffs would have lost their seniority
by accepting reinstatement (unless the), continued the lawsuit). Id. at 231. rhe Court
reaffirmed the rule that "the unemployed or underemployed claimant need not go into
another line of' work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position." Id. at 231-32.
rhe decision may be read to require plaintiffs to plead and accept reinstatement where
reinstatement cannot make them whole. However, in cases when reinstatement to a com-
parable position is impossible, front pay is essential to the "make whole" purposes of
employment discrimination law.
26. 335 F. Supp. at 235.
27. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md. 1977).
28. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (D. Md. 1978).
29. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194 (D. Md. 1979).
30. Covey. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1191-93. The Southern District of Mis-
sissippi also followed M11onroe in Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S,).
Miss. 1975).
31. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
32. 1I. at 1007-08.
33. Id. at 1021.
34. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950. 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 13. reprinledil 1978 U.S.
ConE CONG. & AD. NEws 528. 535) (pension benefits are part of the "items of pecuniary or
economic loss such as wages, fringe, and otherjob related benefits")).
1985]
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remedies available under the FLSA. '" 3 5 The court limited its comments
by noting that front pay awards in title VII and FLSA cases had been
"relatively small" because front pay is both speculative and in return for
"services not rendered," writing that "we suspect that both continuing
payments and substantial awards calculated, for example, on the basis of
life expectancy would be inappropriate."
'3 6
The first court to follow Loeb and award damages was the District of
New Hampshire in Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp. 37 The court denied re-
instatement to the plaintiff, stating that "to order the plaintiff reinstated
would be a harbinger of disaster and a catalyst to more litigation,"' 38 and
that "the defendant's conduct placed the plaintiff who was in advanced
middle age [fifty-three years old at the time of discharge and fifty-eight
years old at the time of the decision] in a precarious position in the avail-
able job market." 39 The court quoted Loeb at length and awarded the
plaintiff $20,000 damages in lieu of reinstatement. The court discussed
front pay, but the $20,000 figure was not derived from the plaintiff's
future potential income with the company. Instead, the damage award
reflected money he had spent starting up his own business when he
could not find a new job after he was wrongfully terminated. 40 The
court also ordered that the plaintiff be treated as a vested employee for
the pension plan. 4 1 Thus, the court approved the award of front pay in
lieu of reinstatement, but did not actually award front pay.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also followed Loeb in Cancellier v.
Federated Department Stores,4 2 when it approved the concept of damages in
lieu of reinstatement, but did not grant them because a large liquidated
damages award made the plaintiff whole.4 3 In Cancellier, reinstatement
was inappropriate because of hostility between the parties as evidenced
by one corporate officer referring to the plaintiff as "a cancer."'4 4 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the award of $2.3
million in damages to three plaintiffs made the plaintiffs whole without
any award of front pay.
45
B. Cases Actually Awarding Front Pay
One of the first cases specifically awarding front pay was O'Donnell v.
Georgia Osteopathic Hospital.4 6 In that case, the trial court followed Hoff-
man and awarded the plaintiff, a hospital employee, front pay. However,
35. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1022.
36. Id. at 1023 (citing Wirtz, 377 F.2d at 115 n.5, and Goldbeig, 302 F.2d at 152).
37. 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981).
38. Id. at 355.
39. Id. at 357.
40. Id. at 355, 357.
41. Id. at 357.
42. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
43. Id. at 1319-20.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th
Cir. 1984).
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unlike Hoffman, in which the damage award reflected the cost of starting
up a business, O'Donnell based its future damage award on the potential
income of the plaintiff.4 7 The court used a three part calculation to de-
termine the amount of the damage award. First, the court projected the
plaintiff's wage at the date of termination through the date of her retire-
ment, and allowed her an eight percent annual pay raise based on the
eight percent raise she received in the last year of her employment.
Next, the trial court deducted the plaintiff's expected earnings from the
date of trial through her projected retirement. It based this figure on
plaintiff's earning an average of $229.82 per month from the time she
left defendant's employ until the time of trial. The court did not factor
any pay raise into the figure it deducted. Finally, it discounted the front
pay award to its present value at an interest rate of five percent and
awarded the plaintiff a lump sum.
4 8
The trial court, however, did not explicitly find whether the hospital
made a legitimate offer of reinstatement. Due to the animosity between
the parties, it found that the defendant's offer was irrelevant, and that
the plaintiff would not have to accept reinstatement. The court wrote
that the plaintiff's desk was moved to face the wall, that she was given
nothing to do, and that she was "harassed and shunned" by her
supervisors .49
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed based
on the district court's findings on the reinstatement issue.50 The em-
ployer had offered unrebutted testimony and affidavits that it made the
plaintiff an offer of reinstatement to a different department at the same
salary. The plaintiff testified that she would refuse any position at the
hospital. 5 1 The circuit court remanded for a finding as to whether the
plaintiff was justified in refusing the offer, writing that "the posture of
this case mandates that front pay may be awarded only after reinstate-
ment is dismissed as a reasonable alternative."
'52
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the front pay issue
in a more complicated situation in Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Company.5 -3
There, the court was presented with a situation where the plaintiff's
plant had closed after he was fired. Unlike the previous cases, the court
found that the parties were not so hostile that the plaintiff would no
longer have been able to work for the defendant. Since the jury never
addressed the issue, the court remanded the case for a jury trial on the
issue of whether the defendant would have transferred the plaintiff to a
different plant were it not for the age discrimination. 5 4 In discussing the
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 221.
50. 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 1551 n.9.
52. Id. at 1552. The holding was a narrow one, as the court reserved judgment on the
issue of whether reinstatement is the preferred remedy under the ADEA. Id. at 1551-52.
53. 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at I 100.
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possibility that the plaintiff could have been transferred instead of termi-
nated, the court noted that there was evidence on the record that
showed "competition in the tire industry for well-qualified managerial
personnel was intense." 55 The court did not, however, discuss how this
evidence would impact the plaintiff's duty to mitigate, using it only to
show that Mohawk might have transferred the plaintiff absent the dis-
criminatory firing.
The Southern District of New York discussed the issue of front pay
at length in Koyen v. Consolidated Edison.56 Koyen was sixty-eight years
old, and the judge awarded him full front pay up to the date of his retire-
ment at age seventy. The court discounted the award at the rate of
eleven percent and awarded Koyen a lump sum at trial. 5 7 The court
wrote that it was authorized under the ADEA to grant plaintiffs whatever
remedies were necessary to compensate them fully and restore them to
the economic position they would have occupied but for their em-
ployer's unlawful discrimination. 58 It dismissed the notion that front
pay awards are too speculative, writing that:
The problem is more imaginary than real. Courts and juries
are not without experience in assessing damages for future loss
of earnings in breach of employment contract and personal in-
jury cases. Each can readily be decided upon its individual
facts. A discharged employee, however much he may be ag-
grieved by his alleged wrongful termination, cannot sit idly by.
He is under a duty to mitigate damages by making reasonable
efforts to obtain gainful employment in an available market. It
is not difficult to determine the availability of employment op-
portunities, the period in which one by reasonable efforts may
be re-employed, the employee's work and life expectancy, the
discount tables to determine the present value of future dam-
ages and other factors that are pertinent on prospective dam-
age awards. The mere fact that damages may be difficult of
computation should not exonerate a wrongdoer from liability.
"The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy
require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncer-
tainty which his own wrong has created." Moreover, to restrict
the employee to losses sustained from the date of discharge to
the date of return of the verdict or entry of judgment would
encourage the employee to delay the judgment date as long as
possible. It would serve to encourage tactics of delay in order
to obtain the benefit of increased verdicts by the mere passage
of time.
59
The court, however, gave no reason why the plaintiff should not
have been reinstated, merely stating that the plaintiff withdrew his re-
quest for reinstatement and preferred an award of front pay. The plain-
55. Id. at 1098.
56. 560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
57. Id. at 1169.
58. Id. at 1168.
59. Id. at 1168-69 (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251. 265
(194()).
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tiff's position did not require a great deal of public contact, and there
was little evidence on the record to show that there was any great ani-
mosity between the parties. 60 This decision demonstrates that a front
pay award may unduly punish the employer if the employee can elect
front pay regardless of an offer of reinstatement. Although reinstate-
ment may have been appropriate, if front pay is awarded the defendant
employer is forced to pay the plaintiff and receive nothing in return. If
the plaintiff were reinstated, the corporation would have paid out the
same amount of money but would have received the plaintiff's labor in
return.
In contrast to the Koyen opinion, the Eighth Circuit in Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc. rejected a trial court award of front pay when
the trial court did not discuss why reinstatement was inappropriate. 6 '
The court wrote that "a district court must carefully articulate its ration-
ale for refusing to compel employment of a plaintiff who has suffered
discrimination." ' 62 The court also noted that "the friction arising from
the litigation process itself is not alone sufficient to deny em-
ployment."
6 3
The Second Circuit upheld an award of front pay in Whittlesey v.
Union Carbide Corp. ,64 awarding the chief labor counsel of Union Carbide
four years of front pay, covering the full period from the time of trial
until plaintiff reached the age of seventy. The court cited Koyen for the
proposition that future damages are not so speculative as to preclude
plaintiffs from recovering front pay.6 5 The court added that the "de-
fendant's increased inclination to compromise when faced with the pos-
sible liability of front pay" would reduce the risk that possible front pay
awards would discourage settlements by encouraging plaintiffs to hold
out for greater amounts of damages. 66 The court also noted the plain-
tiff's duty to mitigate damages by seeking employment elsewhere as a
factor limiting the amount of front pay trial courts could award. 6 7 Un-
like the court in Koyen, the Whittlesey court stressed that reinstatement at
Union Carbide was impossible because Whittlesey would probably be
"ostracized and excluded from the functions of giving counsel," because
the corporation had exhibited unjustified "hostility and outrage" toward
Whittlesey.6 8 The court also noted that Whittlesey was approaching re-
tirement so the front pay would only cover a short period of time, and




61. 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 280 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1981)).
Accord Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1984).
63. 703 F.2d at 281.
64. 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 728.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 729.
69. Id.
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The Sixth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Davis v. Combus-
tion Engineering7 ° and EEOC v. Prudential Savings and Loan Association,
7 1
upheld front pay awards in decisions that were almost simultaneous with
Whittlesey. The Sixth Circuit in Davis wrote: "we hold that front pay is a
remedy available to the trial court for use, in its discretion, in fashioning
relief," and upheld a jury award of $88,800 in front pay.7 2 The court
never articulated any reason why the plaintiff could not be reinstated. It
offered no justification for the $88,800 figure, and the court never dis-
cussed the district court's finding that, due to reductions in force at the
defendant's plant, it was possible that the plaintiff would be lawfully ter-
minated before his mandatory retirement date.
7 3
In Prudential, the Tenth Circuit approved future damage awards but
remanded the case because the trial judge did not say why reinstatement
was not appropriate. 74 The trial court had awarded the plaintiff $17,000
in lost retirement and pension benefits rather than reinstatement.
75
The court reiterated that reinstatement is always the preferred remedy
under the ADEA, but also noted that front pay is available as an alterna-
tive under the ADEA's equitable relief provisions when the plaintiff can
show that his employer has exhibited extreme hostility, making rein-
statement impossible. 76 The plaintiff in Prudential argued that, due to
the defendant's attitude, reinstatement was "a virtual impossibility," but
the district court made no express statement on the issue. The Tenth
Circuit remanded for a finding as to why future damages were more ap-
propriate than reinstatement. 77 The Tenth Circuit also stressed that
trial courts should consider a discharged employee's duty to mitigate
when calculating his future damages.
78
Since the Davis, Prudential and Whittlesey decisions, two more circuits
have approved front pay awards. In Maxfield v. Sinclair International,79 the
70. 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
71. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court vacated Prudential and re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S.
Ct. 613 (1985). Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. EEOC, 105 S. Ct. 896 (1985). The
Tenth Circuit withdrew its opinion. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 753 F.2d
851 (10th Cir. 1985). This article will nonetheless discuss Prudential because Thiiistopi only
addressed the issue of willful violations of the ADEA; it did not discuss front pay. Presum-
ably, the Tenth Circuit's opinion concerning front pay will not change upon
reconsideration.
72. 742 F.2d at 923.
73. Id. See also id. at 924 (Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Front pay is a substitute for reinstatement under the ADEA. The ADEA states that rein-
statement is an equitable remedy. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Thus, although the underly-
ing claim of discrimination is a legal question, Lontlard, 434 U.S. 575, the issue of front pay
is equitable. The question of front pay should be tried to the court after the jury has
determined liability and legal damages. See Ventura, 571 F. Supp. at 5 1. But see Brenemer
v. Great W. Sugar Co., 567 F. Supp. 218 (D. Colo. 1983).
74. Prudential, 741 F.2d at 1232.
75. Id. at 1233.
76. Id. (citing Blim v. Western Elec., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. C.
233 (1984)).
77. 741 F.2d at 1233.
78. Id. at 1232.
79. 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985).
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Third Circuit awarded front pay to a plaintiff who was fired at age sixty-
five from a position selling parts to papermills. The evidence included a
letter from the company to the plaintiff that said "You are beating a
dead horse. I'm sorry you can't let it go and retire with dignity....
Please accept the fact that it is time for a change." 80 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the jury's award of $7,500 front pay. 8' The
court noted that reinstatement is the preferred remedy, but the district
courts may determine that reinstatement is not feasible.8 2 In cases
where reinstatement is not feasible, the court held that "an award for
future lost earnings is no more speculative than awards for lost earning
capability routinely made in personal injury and other types of cases."
83
Finally, in August 1985, the First Circuit resolved the conflict that it
had created with the Loeb opinion. In Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corpora-
tion,84 the First Circuit apologized for "swallowing the bullet for another
day, instead of biting it" in Loeb85 and approved a front pay award. The
court surveyed opinions from other circuits awarding front pay and
adopted a succinct rule for front pay awards:
Future damages should not be awarded unless reinstatement is
impractical or impossible; the district court, then, has discre-
tion to award front pay. Because future damages are often
speculative, the district court, in exercising its discretion,
should consider the circumstances of the case, including the
availability of liquidated damages.
8 6
In this case, although reinstatement was inappropriate, the plaintiff
had been fully compensated by awards of compensatory damages, liqui-
dated damages and damages under local anti-discrimination statutes, so
the First Circuit did not award front pay.
8 7
CONCLUSION
The cases cited above clearly demonstrate that most of the circuits
approve of front pay in ADEA cases, but the standards courts apply
when determining if front pay is appropriate are inconsistent. Front pay
is an appropriate remedy within the broad equitable powers granted to
courts under the ADEA to make plaintiffs whole for the discrimination
they have suffered. In awarding front pay, courts must be cognizant of
the punitive and speculative nature of future damages. Courts must
consider several factors before awarding front pay. Although almost
every circuit has now approved of front pay or has indicated a willing-
ness to approve front pay, few if any trial courts have adequately consid-
ered all of the relevant factors in calculating front pay awards.
80. Id. at 790.
81. Id. at 795.
82. Id. at 796.
83. Id.
84. 771 F.2d 605 (Ist Cir. 1985).
85. Id. at 614 (citing .oc b . "lcxtron, 600 F.2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979)).
86. 771 F.2d at 616.
87. Id. The plaintifl's damage award iotalled $348.518. Id.
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Before awarding front pay, courts must make the threshold deter-
mination that reinstatement is impossible.8 8 Since front pay is compen-
sation for "services not rendered,"8 9 it is particularly punitive when a
plaintiff could return to his former position. If, however, a plaintiff
holds a supervisory position with a high degree of public contact, rein-
statement may be inappropriate. If economic conditions have forced
plant closings or legitimate reductions-in-force, reinstatement may be
impossible.
The facts, however, are not always so clear. In many cases eco-
nomic conditions force corporate "reorganizations" in which a dispro-
portionate number of elderly employees are fired, often when their
pension rights are about to vest.90 The elderly plaintiff's former job
may be divided between several employees. Courts are then in a gray
area where reinstatement may indeed be possible, depending upon the
facts of a particular case. One solution to this reinstatement dilemma
may be to give the employer a choice between creating an equivalent
position or paying future damages.
While many courts have denied front pay because it is too specula-
tive, front pay is not too speculative if courts consider all of the relevant
factors. First, the courts must examine both the economic climate of the
industry in question, and the plaintiff's actual employment status at the
time of trial. In a strong economy, a plaintiff may be able to find an
equivalent or a better position with another firm.9 1 In a poor economy,
legitimate reductions-in-force could eliminate a plaintiff's position. Fu-
ture damages are appropriate only to the extent that a plaintiff actually
was damaged, and are inappropriate if a plaintiff can find a comparable
position. When, however, plaintiffs have few years left before retire-
ment, it may be impracticable and cruel to expect them to find new
work.
92
After showing that reinstatement is inappropriate and that the
plaintiff was actually damaged by the termination, courts must calculate
the front pay award. The court should begin with the amount of money
the plaintiff would have earned absent the termination, then consider
the possibility that the plaintiff would then have received pay raises in
88. See Blim, 731 F.2d 1473; Dickerson, 703 F.2d 276; Boyce, No. 83-M-179 (D. Colo.
Oct. 9, 1984). Some courts, however, continue to refuse to consider whether reinstate-
ment is possible. See, e.g., Davis, 742 F.2d 724; Koyen, 560 F. Supp. 1161.
89. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1023.
90. 600 F.2d 1003.
91. E.g., Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982); Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1535 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
92, Royce, No. 83-M-179 (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 1984). Thejury found the defendant liable
two years before the plaintiffs retirement date. The plaintiff'had worked for )avis for over
14 years. In view of the size of plaintiff's former office and the animosity created by the
suit. Judge Matsch held that reinstatement would "denigrate the purposes of the Ao."
Boyce. 83-N- 179, slip. op. at 2. It is implicit that plaintiff would have becen unable to find an
equivalent position before her retirement, and judge Matsch awarded full front pay
through her retirement date. Id.
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his former job.93 The courts should offset that amount by prospective
pay raises in his substitute job. Courts must then discount the award to
present value. Finally, judges should deduct any liquidated damage
awards that have made the plaintiff whole, thus reducing additional fu-
ture damages to the extent that they are unnecessary.
Failure to consider all of these factors leads to confusion among
practitioners and sets weak precedent for future awards. If trial judges
carefully delineate their front pay calculations, they will encourage set-
tlement by reducing uncertainty and more adequately assure both that
plaintiffs are fully compensated and that defendants are not unduly
punished.
Arnold C. Macdonald
93. E.g., O'Donnell, 574 F. Supp. 214. The author has found no cases that consider pay
raises in plaintiffs substitute job.
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